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# KIIT
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## NATO

## STUDY GUIDE

*"Reviewing and enhancing NATO Partnerships in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe"*
This agenda, in particular, has been chosen as it encompasses everything under the mandate of NATO as well as all its regional challenges. The agenda examines the budgetary crisis of NATO, its relationship with Turkey, stance against the Russian threat as well as internal partnerships which collectively strengthen security. This document will breifly explain all the aforementioned topics. However, it will be left to the Member State Representatives to reconcile and interweave all the topics into one narrative and discuss about it in the upcoming NATO Summit.

## 1. Turkey's Relations with NATO :

According to Turkey's official Foreign Ministry website, "Ever since our NATO membership in 1952, the North Atlantic Alliance has played a central role in Turkey's security and integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. Turkey, in return, has successfully
assumed its responsibilities in defending the common values of the Alliance. Turkey is of the utmost importance to NATO's role in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and providing a forum for politico-military consultations on issues of interest to its members. Indivisibility of Alliance security, solidarity among Allies and a fair risk and burden sharing as well as the consensus rule, are NATO's guiding principles and should remain as such. Adherence to these principles as well as NATO's ability to adapt to the changing security environment have made NATO the most successful military alliance in history. The success of current and future missions and operations will play a crucial role in shaping NATO's future. Turkey will continue to provide appropriate support to these operations."

However, there have been many questions with regard to its commitment to the ethos of NATO Charter and its functional values lately. Many NATO members have observed recent developments in Turkey's foreign policy with great concern. Growing tension between Turkey and its allies, particularly with the United States, is cited as the main reason for such concern. Turkey's enhanced contacts with Russia and its move to procure the S-400 missile defence system also went on to erode trust and confidence regarding Turkey's reliability and predictability as a NATO ally.

One of the primary reasons why Turkey is increasingly being perceived as a liability rather than an asset is due to the increasingly politicized nature of its foreign policy making. As a result, foreign policy issues began to be instrumentalised for domestic political purposes, whilst multilateral formats have been used as a leverage to solve bilateral problems. For example, as Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated, the former resorted to hindering Israel's participation in NATO fora, primarily the Mediterranean Dialogue. Instead of empathy, such an attitude frustrated the NATO allies, for it affected the partnership and cooperation programmes of the Alliance as a whole.

Secondly, Turkey's cooperation with Russia and its decision to buy S-400s from Russia lead to serious confusion among NATO allies. The S-400s will not be inter-operable with allied defence mechanisms and therefore will not be integrated into the existing defence

system of which Turkey and other NATO countries are a part. Furthermore, buying S-400s

from Russia will result in a duality in Turkey's defence, which primarily used western equipment, and will complicate the integrity of existing NATO systems shared for Turkey's defence. Such a duality, in the final analysis, may well end up weakening Turkey's defence instead of enhancing it.

Turkey has been suffering from the effects of terrorism for more than three decades. Turkey's border security has been seriously weakened due to the developments in Syria and Iraq. The rapid transformation of civilian unrest in Syria, first into a fertile environment for the settlement of radical terrorist groups and then into a devastating civil war, exacerbated the

challenges to Turkey's security. Turkey's border with Syria has been exposed to infiltration by

terrorist elements in both directions, affecting not only Turkey but also Europe's stability and security. The growing chaos also exacerbated differences of opinion between Turkey and its allies about the roots of the Syrian problem. Turkey argued that an immediate toppling of the regime in Syria should be the priority, whereas the international community focused on combating Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL).

Turkey and the United States had difficulty in identifying the parameters of a common platform in the fight against ISIL terrorism in Syria. Turkey supported the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a faction of the Syrian opposition, and argued that this formation could be militarily efficient both against ISIL and against the Syrian government forces. The United States, however, prioritised the fight against ISIL and tacitly agreed that Russia and the Syrian government could also play a role in this task.

The joint Turkey-US "train and equip programme" failed to reassure Washington that the FSA could contribute effectively to this coalition. The US preference to rely on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which also included Syrian Kurdish formations, namely PYD and YPG, resulted in a more acute disagreement between Turkey and the US, as the former perceived those Kurdish groups to be an extension of the PKK terrorist organisation. Turkey's

closer coordination with Russia can best be defined as an attempt to facilitate the peace talks in Geneva in order to find a solution to the Syrian problem. As Turkey failed to identify a common platform, particularly with the US in Syria, its consultations with Russia increased.

At the beginning of 2017, these efforts enabled Turkey and Russia to sponsor direct talks between the representatives of the Syrian opposition and those of the Syrian government in Astana, Kazakhstan. Several rounds of talks in Astana, succeeded by follow-up meetings in Sochi, Russia, helped to establish a dialogue between the main local actors of the Syrian civil war. Turkey and Russia, with the participation of Iran, agreed to the establishment of four deescalation

zones in Syria which were envisaged to facilitate the cessation of hostilities if not the ceasefire directly. Turkey and Russia have also agreed to co-monitor the de-escalation zone in Idlib, in the northwest of Syria.

Turkey's military operation in the Afrin region of Syria aims at the eradication of PYD/YPG elements from Turkey's border area and intends to facilitate the return of a part of the 3.5 million strong contingent of Syrian refugees resident in Turkey to those liberated

areas. Turkey's declaration that military operations may be expanded further to the east, where American troops are deployed, causes the serious concern among NATO allies that a confrontation between the two major allies may occur and endanger the solidarity of the Alliance.

The recent emphasis in Turkey's foreign policy on the Middle East and North Africa is hard to overlook. Turkey's self-defined security concerns and its rapprochement with Russia are also seen as a justification of an increased focus on this area. This trend, however, does not mean that Turkey will end up deviating from its current security preferences. Turkey's membership of NATO is a corollary to the enhancement of its national security, complementing its national defense strategy. Turkey's contribution to Euro-Atlantic defense and security cannot be underestimated. Therefore, it is necessary to reaffirm the terms of this mutually reinforcing allied relationship.

NATO Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council have repeatedly confirmed that they understand Turkey's security concerns and support its fight against terrorism. On the other hand, Turkey's willingness to finalise the S-400 deal with Russia still raises question marks. Turkey's agreement to take part in the French-Italian consortium for the EUROSAM project, for the time being, remains as a reassurance that Turkey's security strategy will continue to be in compliance with its commitments to the NATO Alliance. Both sides, however, have to be careful to not endanger the solidarity of the Trans-Atlantic alliance and have to strengthen their coordination. Failure to do so will only benefit NATO's enemies and make the long-standing collective defence of its members vulnerable.

NATO-Black Sea Strategy

The Black Sea region is of crucial significance for Europe, being a major crossroads and critical intersection of east-west and south-north corridors. Many experts believe that whoever controls or dominates the Black Sea can easily project power to the European continent, mainly in the Balkans and Central Europe, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the South Caucasus and the northern Middle East. The region is home to three NATO members (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and several NATO partner countries, so any instability or hostility in the area directly impacts the Alliance. Russia's actions were in focus at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, when Allied leaders clearly stated that "Russia's recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment."

Over the past few years, Russia has steadily upgraded its military posture and matched it with an uncompromising and assertive information campaign. Most Russia experts consider that Moscow is doing this primarily in pursuit of its strategic objective of great power status and the establishment of zones of privileged influence. Hard facts support this claim. The latest and probably most serious threats to the European security architecture, openly challenging the established world order, have occurred in the Black Sea region: Russia's conflict with Georgia in 2008, its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continuing destabilising activities in eastern Ukraine. Beyond using conventional military force, Russia is applying asymmetrical means of warfare in this region, aimed at disturbing and

incapacitating the nations' sovereign decisions and their processes of democratisation and Euro-Atlantic integration. The challenges to security in the Black Sea region are all interconnected and inextricably intertwined in the wider context of Euro-Atlantic security. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is military jargon to describe the situation when a state deploys weapons systems, often with long-range capabilities, to deny foreign forces freedom of movement in the theatre. Land-based surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface ballistic or cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles are the capabilities most often used for building up A2/AD. Additional elements may be added to the system – for example, advanced aircrafts, surface ships and submarines, and their capabilities for air superiority and for control of the seas. Enhanced communications and surveillance systems and cyber warfare capabilities also contribute to this comprehensive A2/AD network, which will try to disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum and deprive foreign forces of its use. It is not the A2/AD concept that is new. But the deployment of substantial amounts of this new military equipment raises questions about the purpose and intentions hidden behind Russia's buildup. As early as 2010, the Russian State Armaments Programme prioritised the Black Sea Fleet for a significant capability upgrade. In 2015 and 2016, the Black Sea Fleet received the first of six planned upgraded KILO-class submarines and the first of six planned Admiral Grigorivich

class frigates. They added to the sophisticated A2/AD system with their long-range anti-ship missiles as well as the long-range land-attack cruise missiles.

A number of NATO member states and non-governmental organisations have been vocal and candid about Russia's malign activities which aim to erode democratic institutions by exploiting the features of open economies and societies. Numerous reports describe the toolbox and options Russia is using for this. Among the most visible actions is the active propaganda campaign, which aims to create new or reignite old historic issues which make cooperation in the region less likely, while at the same time undermining trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions – including both NATO and the European Union. As a result, the entire region, down to each individual country, is weaker, less open for integration and dangerously prone to subversion. A regular instrument of choice is the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories, many of which suggest a hidden Western agenda. More often the aim is to fuel anti-establishment grievances, including direct support for political parties with anti-NATO agendas and anti-European agendas, feeding Euro-skepticism at large. A recent trend reveals efforts to further polarise societies that have already shown signs of division over the question of immigration or liberal democratic values. Post-Soviet protracted (often called 'frozen') conflicts are all concentrated in the Black Sea region. They create 'grey zones' that potentially could or are already fueling organised crime, smuggling and radicalization. It requires little effort to see how Russia exploits all of them for political intimidation of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

For NATO this is clearly a challenge, since all those conflicts have significant potential to destabilise the whole region rapidly. The EU's Global Strategy, adopted in 2016, also identifies the protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region as a challenge "to the European security order". As the Black Sea is a key transit corridor for energy resources, a major issue

is the security of supply. The existing security environment also raises concerns about the

ability to exploit fossil fuels in littoral waters. At the same time, the interdependence of gas imports creates unavoidable political implications, and these imports are easily used for political purposes. Still, the European Union's members and other nations have taken steps to address this issue, and the natural gas market is beginning to resemble the oil market, where price – rather than location – determines transactions. Of course, there is high need of connectivity among local gas networks in Europe. For millennia, the Black Sea region has been an intersection of communication lines between Europe and the Middle East, from the Eastern Balkans to the South Caucasus. The security of these lines of communication is crucial for trade and prosperity in the region and beyond. In this context, it is obvious that the current instability chokes economic development and potential in the region, which sea trade and closer economic integration could uncap. NATO had made it clear on numerous occasions that the Alliance had no intention to deploy forces in the east or southeast of Europe. However, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea triggered the Alliance to deliver on its core task – collective defence – and ensure its credibility. Steps have been taken to strengthen NATO's presence in the Black Sea region, which are a defensive and proportionate response to Russia's use of military force against its Black Sea neighbours. At the same time, Allies have agreed to keep open channels of communication with Russia, demonstrating their will to ensure predictability and transparency.

The Black Sea region is the south-eastern flank of the Alliance. In light of the regional realities and security challenges, NATO has strengthened its deterrence and defence posture with tailored forward presence measures. These are a peacetime demonstration of NATO's resolve to ensure effective deterrence and credible collective defence. The tailored forward presence measures include a land component – a multinational framework brigade for integrated training – as well as measures for strengthened air and maritime presence in the region.

Among the measures announced, the following have already been developed:

● The multinational brigade in Craiova, for which Romania is a framework nation, forms the land component of the forward presence. Currently ten Allies – Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal – have committed to it, contributing to the brigade headquarters and coordinating enhanced training.

● In the air domain, Canada and Italy are reinforcing the efforts of Romania and Bulgaria for air policing.

● In the maritime domain, standing NATO maritime forces are present with more ships and more naval exercises. A Black Sea functional centre has been established within the NATO Maritime Command, which focuses on the regional specific security issues and maintains tight links with the regional navies.

● Last, but not least, a new enhanced training initiative aims to bring more coherence in all training efforts.

In light of the new Russian military posture and notwithstanding the deterrence and defence posture that NATO has developed in response, the Alliance and its leaders are committed to pursuing a dual track approach. As agreed at the Warsaw Summit, while strengthening deterrence and defence capabilities, the Alliance remains open to focused and meaningful dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity. The NATO-Russia Council has met six times

since April 2016, providing opportunities for the Allies to openly discuss with Russia issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction.

At the Warsaw Summit, Allied leaders stated that more stable NATO neighbours means more security for the Alliance and that "...against the background of increasingly unstable global security environment… NATO seeks to contribute more to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside its territory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall." To achieve this, Allies have strengthened their focus on areas of increased risk and are engaging with partners in the Black Sea region with the entire spectrum of instruments in their cooperative security toolbox. This includes regular consultations on the strategic assessment of the security situation in the Black Sea region, planning for relevant exercises, and accelerated practical support for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

NATO has stood firmly on its position of non-recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, which was reiterated during the North Atlantic Council visit to Kyiv in July 2017. In addition to its political support, NATO has increased significantly its practical support for Ukraine, providing tailored assistance to support reform in its security and defence sector as well as to develop capability and capacity through a Comprehensive Assistance Package agreed at the Warsaw Summit. Some of the elements of this package are directly related to Black Sea security. For instance, through a regional airspace security project, Ukraine will improve its ability to handle air security incidents. Other projects aim at enhancing Ukraine's capabilities for secure command and control and situational awareness. NATO is also contributing to the development of Ukraine's Maritime Academy, which was moved to Odessa following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. Georgia is one of NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partners, which allows for extensive political and practical interaction. Furthermore, the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package of cooperation in the area of defence capacity building, launched at the NATO Summit in Wales 2014, has been evolving to match negative security developments in the Black Sea region. The package includes support for 13 areas, encompassing all three military services. It involves strategic level advice and liaison, defence capacity building and training activities, and multinational exercises. NATO's engagement with the Moldova has also been stepped up, at the government's request, to support defence institution building and reforms. A Defence Capacity Building Package was agreed at the Wales Summit, and a NATO Liaison Office was established in Chisinau at the end of 2017.

NATO has the political clout of its 29 member states and the most advanced defence capabilities at its disposal for the collective defence of each of its members. It is lending political support to its partners as well as helping them build sound defence institutions that generate the capacity to protect their national sovereignty. Still NATO has certain limitations.

In particular, it is proving challenging to adapt and respond to hybrid tactics and threats, analysing Russian malign operations in detail. Such activities lie on edge of traditional warfare but still outside of the defence domain. Therefore it is the responsibility of each nation to develop its institutional and societal resilience to counter such tactics. However, NATO has a natural partner that can bring a lot of added value to addressing

all of the above-mentioned challenges – the European Union. Twenty-two NATO Allies are also members of the European Union. So it is natural for both organisations to work together to promote the development of the Black Sea region and address its security challenges. Indeed, the two organisations have agreed to strengthen cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises. In particular, the European Union can add value by promoting democracy and good governance – this is the basic fundament to achieve durable and long-term stability in the Black Sea region.

## NATO-Russia Relations

For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Cooperation has been suspended in response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, which the Allies condemn in the strongest terms. Political and military channels of communication remain open. NATO remains concerned by Russia's continued destabilising pattern of military activities and aggressive rhetoric, which goes well beyond Ukraine. NATO followed developments in Ukraine closely from the beginning of the crisis, which has had serious implications for NATO-Russia relations.

After Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Alliance took immediate steps in terms of its relations with Russia. It suspended the planning for its first NATO-Russia joint mission and put the entire range of NATO-Russia cooperation under review. In April 2014, NATO foreign ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia but to maintain political contacts at the level of ambassadors and above, to allow NATO and Russia to exchange views, first and foremost on the crisis in Ukraine. While the suspension of cooperation with Russia continues today, channels of political dialogue and military communication are being kept open. The NATO Russia Council (NRC) is meeting periodically on the basis of reciprocity – it is an important forum for dialogue and information exchange, to reduce misunderstandings and increase predictability.

NATO has identified ways to transfer those cooperative projects that impact on third parties, in particular the NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project, to other non-NRC mechanisms or structures. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders condemned in the strongest terms Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and demanded that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and along the country's border. NATO leaders also demanded that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from

aggressive actions against Ukraine; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. They reaffirmed that NATO does not and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea.

At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies also noted that violence and insecurity in the region led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. They said that those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17

should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible. In May 2018, the Joint Investigation Team, which is investigating the MH17 crash, concluded that the BUK-TELAR that was used to down the aircraft originated from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, a unit of the Russian army from Kursk. Allies stand in solidarity with the Netherlands and Australia, which call on Russia to take State responsibility for the downing of flight MH17. Allies strongly support the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine by diplomatic and peaceful means and welcome the ongoing diplomatic efforts in this regard. All signatories of the Minsk Agreements must comply with their commitments and ensure their full implementation. Russia has a significant responsibility in this regard.

For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NRC, based upon the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, breaking the trust at the core of its cooperation with NATO. The decisions NATO leaders took at Wales demonstrate their respect for the rules-based European security architecture. The Allies continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law, would be of strategic value. They continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia – including reciprocal confidence-building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe – based on common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. They regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia, but it will not compromise on the principles on which the Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. At the 2014 Summit in Wales, the Alliance said that the nature of the Alliance's relations with Russia and its aspiration for partnership will be contingent on seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allies agreed to strengthen their deterrence and defence posture, while remaining open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity. Allies agreed that Ukraine would continue to be the first topic on the agenda at the NRC. Allies also decided to keep open military lines of communication.

NATO's concerns go well beyond Russia's activities in Ukraine. Notably, Russia's military activities particularly along NATO's borders have increased. Russia's behaviour continues to make the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable and predictable, in

particular its practice of calling snap exercises, deploying near NATO borders, conducting large-scale training and exercises and violating Allied airspace. Russia's military intervention and considerable military presence in Syria have posed further risks for the Alliance. On 5 October 2015, in response to Russia's military intervention in Syria, the Allies called on Russia to immediately cease their attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians, to focus its efforts on fighting so-called Islamic State, and to promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition.

In 2016 and 2017, the NRC met six times to discuss three important topics: 1) the crisis in and around Ukraine, including the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements; 2)

issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction; 3) assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan, including the regional terrorist threat. In March 2018, in response to the use of a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury, the Alliance expressed solidarity with the United Kingdom, strongly condemned the attack, and reduced the maximum number of personnel in the Russian Mission to NATO by 10 people. In April 2018, Allies expressed strong support to the US, UK and French joint military action in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

At the NRC meeting on 31 May 2018, three issues were discussed:

1) the crisis in and around Ukraine, including the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements;

2) issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction;

3) asymmetric techniques as aspects of doctrine and strategy.

NATO and Russia both briefed on major upcoming exercises. They have profound and persistent disagreements. NATO's decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia remains in place. Political and military channels of communication, however, remain open. Dialogue is necessary among nations that share a common Euro-Atlantic space, including to reduce the risk of military incidents.

**Links for further research :**

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa

https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/02/01/turkey-and-nato-are-growing-apart

http://www.natolibguides.info/Turkey

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turkey-and-nato-seen-ankara-15201

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-black-sea-region-a-critical-intersection-nato-security/EN/index.htm

http://www.gmfus.org/events/nato%E2%80%99s-response-challenges-black-sea

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_Forum_for_Partnership_and_Dialogue

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/20171107_1711-NATO-Russia_en.pdf

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm

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https://nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180606_1806-factsheet_efp_

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https://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm

https://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm

https://rferl.org/a/1099020.html